From Tatemae to Honne: A Historical Perspective on the Prohibition of Insider Trading in Japan by Small, Richard
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 2 
January 2003 
From Tatemae to Honne: A Historical Perspective on the 
Prohibition of Insider Trading in Japan 
Richard Small 
Momo-o, Matsuo & Namba 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Small, From Tatemae to Honne: A Historical Perspective on the Prohibition of Insider Trading in 
Japan, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 313 (2003), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
313 
Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 
 
VOLUME 2 NUMBER 2 2003 
 
FROM TATEMAE TO HONNE: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROHIBITION OF 
INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN 
RICHARD SMALL∗ 
Insider trading is as illegal in Tokyo as breaking the speed limit—and 
about as widespread.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A quiet revolution has been taking place in Japan. The regulation of 
insider trading is being taken more seriously than ever. If the present 
enforcement and regulation trends continue, Japan’s prohibition of insider 
trading, oft considered a vital thread in the complex tapestry of regulation 
necessary for the creation of a successful financial market, will become truly 
world class. This is all the more remarkable in light of the criticism heaped 
on Japan a little over a decade ago for its lack of enforcement.  
This Article analyzes the development of Japan’s regulation of insider 
trading from 1948 to the present. It argues that the prohibition can be divided 
into two distinct phases of development. The underlying rationale for the 
regulation and its enforcement, or lack thereof, in each of the phases is traced 
through an examination of the history of the prohibition. This Article 
demonstrates that the raison d’être of the prohibition has shifted from being 
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 1. Japan: Police to Crack Down on Insider Trading, ECONOMIST, May 19, 1990, at 131. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p313 Small book pages.doc  11/11/2003   10:01 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
314   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2:313 
 
 
 
 
one of tatemae (first as an unsuccessful transplant of law from one country to 
another, and second as a response to international criticism, domestic 
scandal, and regulatory competition) to one of honne (which reflects the 
fundamentally changing structure of the Japanese economy, resulting in a 
real desire to enforce the prohibition).2 Part II investigates the background to 
the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (SEL 1948) and identifies the 
provisions that were applicable to insider trading.3 It then discusses the 
reason for the prohibition’s failure. Part III considers the amendments made 
to the SEL 1948 in 1988 (1988 Amendments). It contends that those 
amendments were once again the product of tatemae. The post-1988 
revisions to the law, the case law, and the development of an independent 
watchdog are discussed in Part IV. It argues that these developments, driven 
by a pressing need to reform Japan’s economy in the aftermath of the bubble, 
marked the major turning point in the enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition in Japan. This Article concludes, in Part V, that while Japan has 
adopted a new rationale for regulation, it still lacks the depth of commitment 
of the United States. Nonetheless, it welcomes Japan’s recent crackdown on 
insider trading. 
II. THE ANATOMY OF TATEMAE 
A. Securities and Exchange Act 1948 
The genesis of Japan’s insider trading prohibition can be found in the 
Allied Occupation of Japan, which lasted from 1945 to 1952. During this 
period the Allies effectively imposed many changes on the Japanese legal 
system.4 
According to Kawamoto, the shareholder democracy movement in Japan 
was born out of the dismantling of the zaibatsu after the end of the Second 
World War.5 He tells of stock traders gathering in buildings and public parks, 
 
 
 2. Tatemae and honne are two concepts that are fundamental to the understanding of Japanese 
society. Tatemae is defined as “a principle; a policy; a rule . . . .” KENKYUSHA’S NEW JAPANESE 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1750 (Koh Masuda ed., 4th ed. 1974). It does however have much greater 
meaning in Japanese society. In fact it can be defined as “face” or in Italian as “bella figura.” 
Kenkyusha’s defines honne as “one’s real [true] intention; one’s true [real, underlying] motive.” Id. at 
482. Thus, tatemae is the face that is presented to the public, whereas honne is one’s honest inside 
feelings, generally not for public display. 
 3. Shôken torihiki hô [Securities and exchange law], Law No. 25 of 1948. 
 4. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 29-31 (2d ed. 1992). 
 5. ICHIRÔ KAWAMOTO & YASUNAMI ÔTAKE, SHÔKEN TORIHIKI HÔ TOKU HON [SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE LAW: A PRIMER] 7-8 (4th ed. 2000). The zaibatsu were large corporate conglomerates 
often blamed for the build-up of Japan during the Second World War. Although theoretically broken 
up after the end of the War, they effectively regrouped into looser corporate structures known as 
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necessitating fixed rules for dealing, and the reopening of the stock 
exchange. Kawamoto further recounts that those associated with the 
securities business who hoped for an early reopening of the stock exchange 
often implored the General Headquarters (GHQ) for permission to reopen the 
exchanges, but the GHQ refused on each occasion. The GHQ did not accept 
the proposed laws which the Japanese modeled after their old laws.6 
However, when the Japanese subsequently redrafted their proposed law after 
the Securities Act of 1933 (SA 1933)7 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (SEA 1934),8 the GHQ accepted the new law and allowed the 
reestablishment of the securities industry to go forward.9 Thus, Japan 
promulgated the Securities and Exchange Law of 1947.10 Soon, however, the 
SEL of 1948 replaced the 1947 version.  
Four main articles of the SEL 1948, each of which was based on an 
American counterpart, could be interpreted as being applicable to insider 
trading. The first Article 58, was a generally worded anti-fraud provision 
which was clearly based on Section 10(b) of the SEA 1934.11 However, 
Article 58 did not develop in the same manner that Section 10(b) did in the 
United States.12 To date, only one case has been brought to trial under Article 
58.13 There are both cultural and economic reasons for the lax enforcement of 
Article 58, which will be investigated at greater length below. Second, 
Article 50(3) granted the Ministry of Finance authority to promulgate 
Ministerial Orders to combat acts relating to securities transactions that may 
be “prejudicial to the protection of investors, detrimental to the fairness of 
transactions or undermining the credibility of the securities industry.”14 
                                                                                                                         
 
keiretsu. See infra notes 52, 58-62 and accompanying text. 
 6. See id. at 7-8. The General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, 
under whose control Japan was placed following the end of the Second World War, was responsible 
for the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). 
 9. See KAWAMOTO & ÔTAKE, supra note 5, at 7-8. 
 10. Shôken torihiki hô [Securities and exchange law], Law No. 22 of 1947. 
 11. Article 58 provided that: 
No person shall commit an act described in the following items: (1) To employ any fraudulent 
device, scheme or artifice with respect to buying, selling or other transactions of securities. (2) To 
obtain money or other property by using documents or by any representation which contain an 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading. 
SEL 1948, art. 58. 
 12. The SEC used its authority under Section 10(b) to fashion Rule 10b-5, itself patterned after 
Section 17(a) of the SA 1933, which became its favored and highly successful weapon for tackling 
insider trading. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 445-57 (1985). 
 13. Judgment of May 25, 1965, Saikosai (Supreme Court) 155 SAIBANSHU KEIJI 831. 
 14. SEL 1948, art. 50(3). 
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Finally were Articles 188 and 189, which had their roots in Sections 16(a) 
and 16(b) of the SEA 1934 respectively. Article 188 required those defined 
as insiders to report their stockholdings, and any changes thereto, to the 
government. Article 189 essentially provided that a company would have a 
right to disgorge the profit that an officer of the company made from a 
purchase and sale, or vice versa, of his company’s stock within a six month 
period using confidential information obtained through his position.15 It 
further provided that, if the company failed to pursue said officer within sixty 
days after a stockholder’s request to do so, the stockholder could bring an 
action on behalf of the company.16  
In 1953, shortly after the American occupation ended Article 188 was 
repealed, a move that effectively rendered Article 189 moot.17 This created 
something of a lacuna. How could an action be brought under Article 189 if 
the primary tool for monitoring insiders had been repealed? The official 
reason for Article 188’s repeal was that it was “inefficient.”18  
However, a number of alternative reasons have been advanced. First, 
Japanese commentators have noted that Article 188’s inefficiency was due to 
the fact that Japanese law does not require a beneficial owner of stock to 
register the stock in his own name.19 Thus, corporations could easily 
circumvent the reporting requirements.20 Second, because Article 188 did not 
provide for public disclosure—only reporting to the government—other 
shareholders would be unable to access the information necessary to launch 
an action.21 A third explanation provided by a Ministry of Finance official 
related to the fact that, before the advent of the computer, it was not practical 
for Ministry of Finance officials to deal with the vast volume of paperwork 
generated by Article 188’s compliance requirements. Likewise, Article 188 
imposed too much of a burden on insiders to prepare such reports.22 Fourth, it 
has been suggested that it was not that the law was seen as inefficient, but 
 
 
 15. SEL 1948, art. 189, items (1)-(3).  
 16. Id. 
 17. Shôken torihiki hô no ichibu wo kaisei suru hôritsu [Law for the partial amendment of the 
securities and exchange law], Law No. 142 of 1953. See KAWAMOTO & ÔTAKE, supra note 5, at 11.  
 18. Akio Takeuchi, Insaidâ torihiki kisei no kyôka (ge) [Strengthening the insider trading 
regulations (II)], 1144 SHÔJI HÔMU 9, 10 (1988) [hereinafter Takeuchi (II)].  
 19. Akio Takeuchi, Naibusha torihiki: soron [Insider trading: An introduction], 41 SHÔKEN 
KENKYÛ 133 (1971). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Kazuteru Kami, Naibusha torihiki kisei: Naibusha ni yoru jisha kabushiki no tanki baibai 
[The regulation of insider trading: Short-swing transactions of an insider’s company’s stocks by the 
insider], 806 KINYÛ SHÔJI HANREI 110 (1988) [author’s translation]; see Takeuchi (II), supra note 18, 
at 10. 
 22. Kiichi Miyazawa, Naibusha torihiki kisei no seibi ni tsuite [Concerning the improvement of 
the regulation of insider trading], 445 SHÔKEN GYÔHÔ 19, 23 (1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss2/2
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rather that it was “excessive.”23 The business community was reportedly 
opposed to Article 188, and that opposition led to the revision of the law. 
That opposition could be read as implying that Article 188 had some sort of 
deterrent effect. According to Ishizumi “the reporting requirement, backed by 
criminal sanction, functioned as psychological pressure upon insiders to 
refrain from advantageously exploiting inside information on the markets.”24 
Finally, Article 190 prohibited insiders from making short sales of their 
corporation’s listed stock, punishable by a maximum fine of 300,000 yen.25 
However, according to a report in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, as of June 10, 
1988 no case was ever initiated under this article.26 
Contemporaneous with the adoption of the SEL in 1948, the Japanese 
government established a Securities and Exchange Commission with duties 
similar in nature to its American namesake.27 However, shortly after the end 
of the Occupation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, along with 
Article 188, was abolished, and a new Securities and Exchange Council was 
established instead.28 Unlike its predecessor, which served as an independent 
body charged with supervision of the markets, the new Securities and 
Exchange Council was an advisory body, and eventually became a section of 
the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance.29 As a result, Japan lost its 
independent watchdog for the securities markets. 
B. Informal Controls on Insider Trading 
In addition to the provisions of the SEL 1948, there were a number of 
attempts to combat insider trading via informal methods. For example, in 
1965, the Ministry of Finance issued an ordinance under the authority of 
Article 50, restricting directors, officers, and other securities company 
employees from buying or selling securities on the basis of confidential 
information obtained in the course of their business.30  
 
 
 23. Kanji Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation: An Examination of Section 16(b) and a Proposal 
for Japan, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 488 (1979). 
 24. Id. at 489. 
 25. SEL 1948, art. 190. 
 26. Shôken torihiki kenkyûkai, Insaidâ torihiki kisei (14) [Securities Trading Research 
Committee: The Regulation of Insider Trading (14)], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 10, 1988, at 23.  
 27. See SEL 1948, arts. 171-81. 
 28. Shôken torihiki hô no ichibu wo kaisei suru hôritsu [Law for the partial amendment of the 
Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 270 of 1952, arts. 165-70. 
 29. Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law Effective 
Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 179, 182. See also ODA, supra note 4, at 
268-69.  
 30. SHÔKEN GAISHA NO KENZENSEI NO JUNSOKUTÔ NI KANSURU SHÔREI [MINISTERIAL 
ORDINANCE CONCERNING RULES ON SOUND MANAGEMENT OF SECURITIES COMPANIES], Ministry of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In 1987, the Stock Exchange issued a notice listing factors that needed to 
be considered in preventing insider trading.31 Furthermore, since 1973, 
securities companies have implemented a policy of Chinese walls intended to 
prevent the flow of information between various departments that could 
facilitate insider trading.32 However, many have criticized this policy as 
being ineffective.33 
The United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
1986 aimed at sharing information in suspected cases of securities law 
violations.34 However, unlike the Memoranda of Understanding that the 
United States signed with the United Kingdom35 and Germany,36 critics have 
pointed out one rather obvious flaw with the memorandum signed with 
Japan: the Japan Memorandum does not provide any procedural mechanisms 
for dealing with requests for information.37 These various informal actions 
taken against insider trading seem to have made little overall difference to the 
enforcement of Articles 58 and 189, as evidenced by the dearth of cases.  
C. Case Law 
Since the promulgation of the SEL in 1948 until the law’s amendment in 
1988, the Shokusan Jûtaku Sôgo case and the Fujiya case were the only two 
cases relating to insider trading. In the Shokusan Jûtaku Sôgo case, Shokusan 
Jûtaku Sôgo Co. filed suit under Article 189 of the SEL 1948 in the Tokyo 
District Court in 1973 seeking to recover profits made by one of its 
directors.38 The parties settled the case out of court in 1987. In the Fujiya Co. 
                                                                                                                         
 
Finance Ordinance No. 60 of 1965, art. 1(5). 
 31. NAIBU JÔHÔ O RIYÔ SHITA FUKÔSEI TORIHIKI NO BÔSHI NI TSUITE [CONCERNING THE 
TRANSACTIONS BY COMPANY INSIDERS IN THEIR COMPANY’S STOCK] (Tokyo Stock Exchange, June 17, 
1987). 
 32. Shôken torihiki kenkyûkai, Insaidâ torihiki kisei (15) [Securities Trading Research 
Committee: The Regulation of Insider Trading (15)], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 11, 1988. 
 33. See Lu, supra note 29, at 232-33. 
 34. Memorandum on the Sharing of Information, May 23, 1986, U.S.-Japan, 25 I.L.M. 1429 
(1988). 
 35. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry In 
Matters Related to Securities and Between the United States Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry In Matters Relating to 
Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, U.S.–U.K., 43 S.E.C. DOCKET 163 (1986). 
 36. Press Release, SEC and German BAWe Sign Memorandum of Understanding (Oct. 17, 
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/97-922.txt (discussing the Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Administration and Enforcement of 
Securities Laws, Oct. 17, 1997 U.S.-F.R.G.). 
 37. John F. Imhof, The Pathology of Insider Trading and Japan's Amended Securities and 
Exchange Law, 16 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235, 245-46 (1990). 
 38. Shôji hômu topikkusu: shokusan jûtaku jiken saikôsai kettei to rikurûto jiken [The Recruit 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss2/2
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case the company brought an action against its parent, Tokiwa, under Article 
189 of SEL 1948 to recover profits made in a short swing transaction. 
However, the Fujiya Co. case was not really an insider trading case because 
the parent company was forced to sell its holdings in Fujiya to comply with 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange rules for credit transactions. The parties settled in 
1984.39 
D. Of Acorns and Oak Trees 
Despite initial similarities between the Japanese and American legal 
regimes, the prohibition of insider trading in Japan failed to develop into the 
“judicial oak” that it did in the United States.40 Indeed it has been observed 
that where commercial law reforms transplanting Western legal notions have 
been introduced in Asia as a result of economic duress, those reforms have 
often failed.41 
Lord Denning in Nyali Ld. v. Attorney General, also employing the 
metaphor of oak trees, stated that: “Just as with the English oak, so with the 
English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African continent and 
expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will flourish 
indeed, but it needs careful tending.”42 F.S.C. Northrop subsequently 
observed that: “In introducing foreign legal and political norms into any 
society, those norms will become effective and take root only if they 
incorporate also a part at least of the norms and philosophy of the native 
land.”43 
There is an active debate on the transplantability of law. Nicholas Foster 
broadly groups the two sides of the debate into culturalists on the one hand 
and transferists on the other, although he points out that scholars have 
recently begun to try and move past this.44 The position of the transferists is 
                                                                                                                         
 
case and the Supreme Court’s decision in the Shokusan Jûtaku case], 1154 SHÔJI HÔMU 96 (1988) 
[author’s translation]. 
 39. Naibusha torihiki no kisei wa wâku shiteiruka [Are the insider trading regulations working?], 
1013 SHÔJI HÔMU 50 (1984) [author’s translation]. 
 40. In 1975 Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke of the “judicial oak which has grown from little more 
than a legislative acorn” with reference to Section 10(b) of the SEA 1934 and the prohibition of insider 
trading. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 41. Roman Tomasic & Peter Little, Corporate Insolvency and Self-help in Six Asian Legal 
Systems, 6 INSOLVENCY L. J. 63 (1998). 
 42. Nyali Ld. v. Attorney General, 1 Q.B. 1, 16 (C.A. 1956). 
 43. F.S.C. Northrop, The Comparative Philosophy of Comparative Law, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 617, 
657 (1960). 
 44. Nicholas Foster, Transmigration and Transferability of Commercial Law in a Globalized 
World, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 55, 58-59 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 
2002). See also COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken ed., 1997). For a general discussion on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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put forward by Alan Watson among others, and holds that law and society 
are two separate notions, and that as a result law is autonomous from the 
society in which it operates. He argues that good laws are observed by those 
with lawmaking ability and they decide to import or transplant them into 
their own society because the law is good.45 The culturalists on the other 
hand, disagree with Watson’s notions and argue that law, in Foster’s words, 
is “a culturally determined artefact” and thus can not be separated from its 
original purpose or the initial circumstances under which it was 
promulgated.46 Otto Kahn-Freund’s scholarship falls more on the culturalist 
side of the debate arguing that there are degrees of transplantability 
depending upon how closely a particular law is related to society and that 
therefore it should not be taken for granted that a law can be transplanted.47 
As discussed above, Japan was obliged to pass the SEL 1948 under 
duress, with little or no concern for the norms or culture that was to receive 
the law. Indeed, the wording of Article 58 of the SEL 1948 and Section 10(b) 
of the SEA 1934 was almost identical. There can be little argument, 
especially in the light of the lack of cases, that the law as regards insider 
trading in Japan was a failure, at least until the mid-1990s.  
The question then, is why the law failed to take root. There are a number 
of explanations. First, the original law in the United States was promulgated 
under very special circumstances that were peculiar to the United States and 
did not exist in Japan. Second, the structure of Japan’s economy and society 
was somewhat different to that of the United States at the time. And third, 
Japan’s differing concept of law was not taken into consideration. 
1. The Great Crash of 1929 
One of the defining features of the SA 1933 and the SEA 1934, is that 
they were promulgated, in great part, as a reaction to the Great Crash of 
                                                                                                                         
 
legal transplants, see also Loukas A. Mistelis, Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, 
Legal Transplants, and Law Reform–Some Fundamental Observations, 34 INT’L. LAW. 1055 (2000). 
For an example of the debate beginning to move on see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith 
in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
 45. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 
1993), Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1978). 
 46. See Foster, supra note 44, at 59. The culturalist position is taken up by Legrand and the 
Seidmans. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & 
COMP. L. 111 (1997); Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997); 
Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996); ANN 
WILLCOX SEIDMAN & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: 
PROBLEM SOLVING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD (1994). 
 47. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
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1929.48 One could argue that the prohibition of insider trading in the United 
States was driven by a reaction to a deeply traumatic event, an event which 
did not occur in Japan. The laws were then uprooted and grafted onto a 
country that did not seek to heal such a wound. Rather, the driving force in 
Japan, as noted above, was the desire to reopen their markets. And to do so 
required the satisfaction of a ruler who had until recently still been 
traumatized by the Great Crash. The result was the transplant of a legal 
regime that not only failed to take into account the context against which it 
was created, but also failed to consider the cultural background of the 
receiving country.  
Therefore, to this day, while insider trading is effectively viewed as 
malum in se in the United States as a result of the psychological scaring of 
the Great Crash, in Japan it is simply malum prohibitum, and as such is less 
strictly enforced. Indeed, Whitner comments that: 
This lack of enforcement reflects a general marketplace perception 
that there is nothing wrong with insider trading. Trading on insider 
 
 
 48. On Thursday October 24, 1929 the U.S. stock market crashed, abruptly bringing to a halt a 
decade of prosperity, which many commentators and economists thought could and would last 
indefinitely. In the aftermath of the Great Crash of 1929 there was considered to be an urgent need to 
legislate to answer calls to curb the worst excesses of the stock market. 
In the Securities Act of 1933, and more comprehensively in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
the government had sought to prohibit some of the more spectacular extravagances of 1928 and 
1929. Full disclosure was required on new security issues, although no way was found of making 
would-be investors read what was disclosed. Inside operations and short selling after the manner 
of Mr. Wiggin were outlawed. Authority was given to the Federal Reserve Board to fix margin 
requirements and these could, if necessary, be made a hundred per cent and thus eliminate margin 
trading entirely. Pool operations, wash sales, the dissemination of tips or patently false information 
and other devices for rigging or manipulating the market were prohibited. Commercial banks were 
divorced from their securities affiliates. Most important, the principle was enunciated that the New 
York Stock Exchange and the other exchanges were subject to public regulation and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission was established to apply and enforce such regulation. 
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 183-84 (Penguin Books, 1954). 
 It should be noted however, that prior to the Great Crash of 1929 there had been a movement 
internationally towards corporate law reform. Many European countries enacted new company laws in 
the late 1920s. As Loss and Seligman well document, the Great Crash of 1929 proved to be 
ammunition for one camp in a much longer running battle between two different philosophies 
regarding the regulation of the markets. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 24-25 (3d ed. 1995). On the one hand it was argued that tough punitive laws, 
such as New York’s anti-fraud statute, were the solution, on the grounds that preventative laws would 
be detrimental to honest business. On the other hand it was argued that preventative measures were 
best. Louis D. Brandeis’s Other Peoples Money and How the Bankers Use It, first published in 
Harper’s Weekly in 1913-14, was the leading proponent of the disclosure philosophy. LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1967). Brandeis’s approach 
held that it was not up to the law to stop people from making bad decisions or investments, but that if 
disclosure were required then people could judge for themselves. Thus when the SA 1933 and the SEA 
1934 were promulgated it was against this background. The debate did not end there. Since the 1960s, 
economists have questioned the disclosure philosophy. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, at 26-33. 
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information is viewed by many Japanese investors as a legitimate, 
even necessary, basis for stock market investments. In the light of the 
fact that Japan’s securities laws were imposed upon the country by 
U.S. Occupation forces following World War II rather than adopted in 
response to domestic pressure, it is not surprising that insider trading is 
taken less seriously than in the United States, whose securities laws 
have their roots in the 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent 
Depression.49 
2. Indirect Financing 
In the post-war period, Japanese companies relied mainly on indirect 
financing (borrowing from banks) rather than direct financing (equity or 
debenture) to obtain capital.50 This is attributed to a number of factors, 
including the Japanese government’s low interest rate policy and the 
preference of Japanese individual investors to leave their assets in financial 
institutions for liquidity and safety.51 The latter provided financial institutions 
with a large pool of funds to loan out. The keiretsu corporate structure further 
contributed to the reliance on indirect financing. A keiretsu is best described 
as a network of affiliated corporations, usually organized around a main 
bank, to which fellow keiretsu firms tended to look to for financing.52 
As in Germany during the post-cold-war period,53 the markets were not 
the primary source of capital in Japan. As a consequence of the majority of 
financing being indirect, the importance of the stock market was reduced. 
Therefore, the rationale underlying the prohibition of insider trading in the 
United States was rendered less persuasive in Japan.54 The Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun pointed out that the United States and Europe viewed the 
prohibition of insider trading as a vital part of the capital formation process, 
 
 
 49. Michael Whitner, Japan Tackles Insider Trading, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 15, 15-16 (1988). 
 50. See Diagram 1, infra, at 324. 
 51. JAPAN SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SECURITIES MARKET IN JAPAN 2002 1-5 (2002). 
 52. While Miwa and Ramseyer have recently questioned the very existence of the keiretsu, 
Milhaupt in his rebuttal not only confirms the existence of the keiretsu, but also finds that, in their role 
as main bank, they played some role in limiting bankruptcy in Japan. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the 
(Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 425 (2002); Yoshiro Miwa & Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the Keiretsu, Mar. 2001, 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/.  
 53. Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the 
Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT’L. L. REV. 177, 192 (1995). 
 54. For an overview of the rationale underlying the prohibition of insider trading in the United 
States, see Richard Small, Confidence, Fairness and the Law & Economics Debate of the Prohibition 
of Insider Trading, 3 ICCLP REV. 26 (2000).  
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whereas Japan considered insider trading merely as a case of cheating. As a 
result of this differing view of insider trading it was argued, efficient 
regulations have not advanced as quickly in Japan as in other countries.55 
This could be explained by a Japanese economic mindset that still 
emphasizes indirect rather than direct financing. 
As a result of relying more heavily on indirect finance, the Japanese were 
less concerned with investor confidence since the markets did not play such a 
vital role in the distribution of funds to pertinent sectors of the economy. 
Under Japan’s capitalist development model, as defined by Chalmers 
Johnson, the post-war, high-speed growth period was in large part 
attributable to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s (MITI) 
(now known as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry or METI) 
direction of funds to those companies and industries that needed capital.56 In 
effect, MITI performed the function of distributing funds via the banks rather 
than the stock market. As a result, arguments over the harm caused by insider 
trading to issuers and investors, which were tenuous at best anyway, were far 
less relevant in the Japanese context. 
 
 
 55. Bassoku kyôka no shushi wo hanei [Reflections on the aim of strengthening the penal 
regulations], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Apr. 16, 1999. 
 56. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY, 1925-1975 (1986). The financial institutions further acted in what has been termed a 
“convoy” system whereby the largest of the financial institutions were expected and indeed even 
directed by the Ministry of Finance to quietly rescue those weaker financial institutions when the need 
arose. See Akiko Karaki, Regulation and Compliance in Japanese Financial Institutions, 14 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 327, 338-40 (2001); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Rational Theory of Japanese Corporate 
Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 3 (1996); Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 423 (1994). 
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3. The Keiretsu System 
The keiretsu are defined by their cross-share holding structure, in which 
member companies hold each other’s shares. This has the obvious effect of 
removing a large number of shares from circulation thus reducing the 
liquidity of the stock market. Imhof noted that one result of this arrangement 
was that it since there was such a thin float on Japan’s stock exchanges it was 
relatively easy to manipulate the market.58 Karel van Wolferen contended 
that the securities houses and the keiretsu themselves stood to lose if the 
insider trading regulations were enforced.59 Furthermore, insider trading as a 
result of information sharing between firms was an accepted part of business 
practice in Japan. Indeed one journalist commented in the late 1980s that: 
“The privileged distribution of inside information has traditionally been 
respectable in Japan because it is seen as a way of lubricating corporate 
relationships.”60 
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 57. See JAPANESE SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 51, at 4. 
 58. See Imhof, supra note 37, at 251. 
 59. KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 176 (1993). 
 60. Nigel Holloway, Squeezing the manipulators: Japan Prepares to Tackle Insider Trading in 
 
Diagram 1: Indirect vs. Direct Financing in Japan 1970 - 200057 
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Moreover, since the financial institutions at the core of these large 
keiretsu groups were part of the so-called convoy system it has been 
suggested that they had a “strong influence over the new legislation and 
regulation.”61 One could argue that the keiretsu groups even had the power to 
block laws that were not in their best interests, including those designed to 
combat insider trading. 
Finally, Japanese tolerance for insider trading helped protect domestic 
corporations from foreign takeovers. For example, the United States would 
have benefited from the prohibition of insider trading in Japan being 
enforced because it would have helped to break down the keiretsu structure, 
making it easier for American companies to mount successful takeover bids 
for Japanese companies. It was noted in the late 1980s that as Japanese 
investment grew in the United States, “Congress is going to wonder why it is 
so difficult for U.S. companies to acquire Japanese firms.”62 
4. Japanese Legal Consciousness 
Arguably, the United States and Japan have different legal 
consciousnesses. According to Upham, the laws of the West reflect notions 
of individuality and laissez faire competition that are completely different 
from social norms in Japan, which are built on social relativism and 
cooperation.63 A number of Japanese scholars argue that Japanese behavior is 
conflict adverse.64 Kawashima states: 
Traditionally, the Japanese people prefer extrajudicial, informal means 
of settling a controversy. Litigation presupposes and admits the 
existence of a dispute and leads to a decision which makes clear who 
is right or wrong in accordance with standards that are independent of 
the wills of the disputants . . . [to] resort to litigation has been 
condemned as morally wrong, subversive, and rebellious.65 
                                                                                                                         
 
Equities, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 15, 1988, at 92, 93. 
 61. See Karaki, supra note 56, at 339. 
 62. Nigel Holloway, Tougher Enforcement Planned, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 15, 1988, at 94, 
95. 
 63. See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987); TAKIE 
SUGIYAMA LEBRA, JAPANESE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR (1976). 
 64. Yosiyuki Noda, Nihon-jin no seikaku to sono hô-kannen [The Character of the Japanese 
People and their Conception of Law], 140 MISUZU 2, 14-26 (1971), reprinted in HIDEO TANAKA, THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (1976).  
 65. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE 
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 43-45 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed. 1963). Noda goes even 
further and states, “To never use the law, or be involved with the law, is the normal hope of 
honourable people.” Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 159-60 (1976). 
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As a result of this legal consciousness, people in Japan bring far fewer 
cases than in the United States. Other scholars, however, have submitted 
alternative suggestions for the comparative lack of litigation in Japan. John 
O. Haley, for example, argues that although both Christian and Confucian 
based societies promote a non-litigious solution to disputes, Japan has 
succeeded in the “implementation of this interdiction through institutional 
arrangement.”66 He further posits that the myth of non-litigiousness in 
Japanese society reinforces institutional impediments by providing a 
justification for them.67 Regardless of the reason, the evidence clearly 
suggests that individuals in Japan, when compared to their American 
counterparts, are far less likely to resort to the court system to resolve 
conflicts. This differing legal consciousness has clearly had a negative 
impact on the enforcement of the insider trading regulations. Finally, Imhof 
suggests that the senpai-kôhai relationship,68 the seniority based 
advancement in Japanese companies and the government, and the lack of 
legal absolutism in Japanese society have all contributed to make the 
enforcement of the insider trading regulations a failure.69 
5. Public Prosecutors 
Public prosecutors have not pushed for prosecutions under Article 58. 
Overall, the criminal conviction rate in Japan is nearly one hundred percent.70 
Although public prosecutors have the discretionary power to prosecute, once 
a prosecutor decides to indict, a conviction is expected. In a large number of 
cases, prosecutors drop cases despite indictments. However, if a public 
prosecutor acquires too many not-guilty verdicts it will harm his or her 
career. As a result, public prosecutors are unwilling to prosecute until they 
are certain that they can gain a conviction. It has been reported that Article 58 
was unpopular with prosecutors because they found it difficult to define the 
 
 
 66. John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 359, 389 (1978). 
See also J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 14 J. OF 
JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988). 
 67. See Haley, supra note 66, at 390. 
 68. Senpai is defined in Kenkyusha’s as “a senior; a superior; an elder” whereas kôhai is a 
“younger man; the younger generation.” See Kenkyusha’s, supra note 2, at 1491, 880 respectively. The 
senpai-kôhai relationship in Japanese society is a rigid one that dictates that the kôhai must show 
reverence to the senpai in all matters, even though the kôhai may personally disagree with the senpai. 
 69. See Imhof, supra note 37, at 255-57.  
 70. In 2000 a mere forty-six people were acquitted out of the 986,914 who were prosecuted. This 
works out at approximately only 0.005% of cases resulting in an acquittal. See II-3 Hyô zenji-ken 
saiban kakutei jin-in [Table II-3 Total number of defendant’s final judgments] HANZAI HAKUSHO 
HEISEI 14 NENKAN [CRIMINAL WHITE PAPER 2001], at http://hakusyol.moj.go.jp/image/hoo2003h.jpg. 
See also JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER 121-38 (1991). 
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scope of insider trading.71 Finally, as noted by Haley, the relative lack of 
public prosecutors in Japan forms an institutional impediment to the effective 
enforcement of law.72 In the light of the reluctance of authorities to prosecute 
in general, it is understandable why there have been relatively few 
prosecutions for insider trading. 
6. Bureaucratic Informalism 
“Bureaucratic informalism,” a term coined by Frank Upham, is another 
reason often given for the failure of insider trading regulations in Japan.73 
The bureaucracy drafts almost all laws presented to the Diet. According to 
Upham, bureaucrats prefer vague legislation that needs supplementary 
administrative guidance later on. Under this system, bureaucrats retain social 
control through a system of administrative guidance and ministerial 
ordinances. Thus it was not in the bureaucracy’s interest to allow for easy 
enforcement of the law. Instead, it has been argued that bureaucrats would 
rather erect barriers to shareholder litigation, such as the high cost of 
litigation (due in part to the relative dearth of lawyers in Japan compared to 
the United States) and the lack of class action suits.74 Since public 
prosecutors are unlikely to use vague laws to secure a conviction, 
bureaucratic informalism of the kind described by Upham has certainly 
encouraged non-enforcement of the insider trading laws in Japan. 
7. “Professional” Work 
Tatsuta noted that because few Japanese participated in securities markets 
until the 1980s, the public was indifferent to insider trading regulation. He 
stated that the view at the time was that securities dealing was “professional” 
work; associating “professional” with organized crime. Hard-working non-
professionals believed they had no way of profiting from markets because 
professionals controlled securities deals. Although a non sequitur, Tatsuta 
claims that as a result, most Japanese people did not feel that insider trading 
was immoral.75 
 
 
 71. See Lu, supra note 29, at 187-88 (quoting a Ministry of Finance, Securities Exchange 
Council Report 1976). 
 72. John O. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without 
Sanctions, 8 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 265, 273-74 (1982). 
 73. See Upham, supra note 63, at 16-27. 
 74. Larry Zoglin, Symposium: Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the 
Japanese Equity Market into the Global Securities Market, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 419, 422. 
 75. Misao Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers, and Insider Trading, reprinted in LOUIS 
LOSS ET AL., JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 192 (1983). 
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8. Party Coffers 
Politicians themselves are alleged to have benefited from dubious share 
transactions in order to fund campaigns for public office. Indeed there have 
been a number of stock market scandals over the years in which politicians 
have been implicated. The most famous case to date, the Recruit-Cosmos 
scandal, led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita.76 
As alleged beneficiaries of such dubious share transactions, it is hardly 
surprising that politicians did not endorse more rigorous enforcement of 
insider trading prohibitions.77 
E. Unique Lacunae 
The underlying rationale for the promulgation of the insider trading 
prohibition was one of tatemae. Japan enacted the SEL 1948, including its 
insider trading provisions, out of duress, not choice. As a precondition to re-
opening the securities markets, the Allies forced the Japanese to adopt a legal 
regime that was not compatible with the socio-economic structure of Japan. 
Ostensibly, the Japanese accepted an alien regulatory system to placate the 
Allies.  
With hindsight however, the Japanese government’s actions make it clear 
that it had little or no intention of enforcing the law. They effectively made it 
extremely difficult to enforce Articles 58 and 189 by de-toothing the law, 
abolishing the independent watchdog, and then removing the provision for 
monitoring the markets. As a result of these lacunae, the insider trading laws 
went unenforced.  
In the ensuing years, rather than amend the law to make enforcement 
more effective, the Japanese government remained passive. This subsequent 
failure can be explained, in part at least, by the culturalist theory of legal 
transplants—the law was an unsuccessful legal transplant because the 
original law itself was a product of a unique set of circumstances that bore 
little relevance to the Japanese context. Furthermore, it was roughly grafted 
onto the Japanese legal system with scant regard for Japan’s differing 
 
 
 76. Numerous politicians and senior corporate leaders, including the then NTT Chairman Shindo 
Hisashi, were sold shares in the Recruit-Cosmos company at a deep discount prior to its initial public 
offering, as a form of bribery. It has been estimated that total bribes were about ¥1.33 billion ($1.2 
million) to forty-four politicians. While no charges for insider trading were brought, such cases 
demonstrate why politicians may lack the willpower to create a more transparent financial market. See 
Lu, supra note 29; Holloway, supra note 60, at 93. 
 77. See Zoglin, supra note 74; Lu, supra note 29. 
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historical circumstances and cultural norms. This transplant failure is 
evidenced by the lack of cases.  
III. TOWARDS A MODERN PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING 
A. Radices of Reform 
The events leading up to the promulgation of the 1988 Amendments 
provide vital insight into the reasoning behind their enactment. In 1987, the 
Tateho Affair, a major insider trading scandal brought the matter not only to 
the general public’s attention in Japan, but also to the attention of the foreign 
media. Criticism from domestic and overseas commentators over the 
handling of the case exposed the weaknesses inherent in Japan’s insider 
trading laws.78 The following year, a government report recommended 
strengthening the law. Finally, as the markets began to globalize, external 
factors pressured Japan to conform to the norm against insider trading.79 
1. The Tateho Affair 
Tateho kagaku kôgyô kabushiki kaisha [Tateho Chemical Industries] 
(Tateho), a company listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange, had a market 
capitalization of approximately two and a half billion yen in 1987. That year, 
the company suffered a loss of approximately twenty-four billion yen as a 
result of futures market transactions for Japanese Government Bonds. In 
response to the crises, company management and Tateho’s eight banks 
arranged a conference on August 31, 1987 for the next day. On September 2, 
1987, Tateho publicly announced its losses, which resulted in a considerable 
decline in its stock price.80 
One day before management announced the losses to the public 
(September 1, 1987, during the conference in which Tateho informed the 
banks of the losses), one of Tateho’s banks, Hanshin sôgo ginkô (Hanshin), 
sold 337,000 shares in the company. On September 1st, Tateho shares closed 
at a price of ¥1,820. After the announcement of the losses, Tateho shares 
closed at ¥1,520 (trading limits prevented the stock from closing lower). A 
week later, on September 8th the price stood at ¥720. One month later, on 
 
 
 78. See Tomoko Akashi, Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1296, 1302 (1989). 
 79. See Akio Takeuchi, Insaidâ torihiki kisei no kyôka (jô) [Strengthening the insider trading 
regulations (I)], 1142 SHÔJI HÔMU 2, 3-4 (1988) [author’s translation] [hereinafter Takeuchi (I)]. 
 80. Ichiro Kawamoto, Hô kaisei ni itaru keii [How and why the law was changed], 806 KINYÛ 
SHÔJI HANREI 98 (1988) [author’s translation]. 
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October 2nd, the share price fell to ¥520. As a result of acting on the inside 
information, Hanshin managed to avoid suffering a considerable loss. The 
exact amount of loss avoided is uncalculatable, however, had the bank sold at 
the closing price on September 2nd it would have received only 
approximately ¥512,240,000 as opposed to roughly ¥613,340,000 it received 
for selling at the closing price on September 1st. The Osaka Stock Exchange 
investigated the allegations of insider trading. Incredibly, they issued a 
statement concluding that there had been no wrongdoing on Hanshin’s part.81 
In addition, three management level officers of Tateho were alleged to have 
sold stock in the company between August 11 and August 21, 1987. Of the 
three, the Osaka Stock Exchange, in accordance with Section 189 of SEL 
1948, advised one officer to disgorge his profits back to the company within 
six months.82 The Tateho Affair captured the media’s attention and attracted 
considerable public interest. As a result, numerous commentators have 
pinpointed this scandal as being one of the major factors that triggered the 
adoption of the 1988 Amendments.83 
2. The 1988 Securities and Exchange Committee Report  
In October 1987, the Ministry of Finance set up a special study group 
called the Securities Exchange Committee to investigate the regulation of 
insider trading.84 The report, submitted on February 24, 1988, explained the 
importance of fairness and confidence to the successful operation of the 
 
 
 81. Osaka shôken torihikijo no happô bun [Announcement of the Osaka Stock Exchange], 
reprinted in Kawamoto, supra note 80, at 99-100 [author’s translation]. 
 82. Chôsa kea (gaiyô) [An Outline of the Investigation Results], reprinted in Kawamoto, supra 
note 80, at 99-100 [author’s translation].  
 83. See Kawamoto, supra note 80. See also Harald Baum, Japanese Capital Markets: New 
Legislation, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1989); Lu, supra note 29; Kawamoto & Ôtake, supra note 5, at 19; 
TOKYO BENGOSHIKAI KAISHAHÔBU [COMPANY LAW SECTION OF THE TOKYO LAWYERS 
ASSOCIATION], INSAIDÂ TORIHIKI KISEI GAIDORAIN [INSIDER TRADING REGULATION GUIDELINES] 2 
(1989) [author’s translation]; OSAMU SEKINE, INSAIDÂ TORIHIKI KISEI NO SÔGÔ KAISETSU [A 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS] 1 (1989) [author’s translation]. 
 84. Shôken torihiki shingikai [Securities exchange committee], Naibusha torihiki no kisei no 
arikata ni tsuite [Ways to regulate insider trading], Feb. 24, 1988 [hereinafter Securities Exchange 
Committee Report], reprinted in Zôkangô [Special Issue], Kaisei shôtorihô to kinyû sakimono torihiki 
hô no kaisetsu to kenkyû–insaidâ torihiki kisei wo chûshin ni [Explanation and study of the change in 
the securities and exchange law and the financial futures trading law: The regulation of insider 
trading], 806 KINYÛ SHÔJI HANREI 179 (1988) [author’s translation]. The report made four 
recommendations. Id. First, preventative measures should be improved amongst issuers, on stock 
exchanges, and among broker/dealers. Id. Second, administrative authorities should take appropriate 
measures to enforce the changes. Id. Third, provisions similar to the scrapped Article 188 of the SEL 
1948 should be reintroduced, i.e., that insiders should report to the government any changes in their 
stock holdings. Id. Finally, the penalties for a breach of the insider trading provisions should be 
increased. Id. 
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securities markets, and that in order to ensure such fairness and confidence 
insider trading had to be regulated. The report then examined the treatment of 
insider trading by other major financial markets including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland.  
A number of proposals for the revision of the insider trading regulations 
in Japan then followed. In light of the committee’s findings, the report 
recommended immediate re-regulation of insider trading. The final 
paragraph of the report declared, “we should improve [the regulation of 
insider trading] whenever it is necessary and when we do so we need to take 
into consideration international trends of regulation.”85 
3. Japanese Commentary 
External pressure, closely linked to the Tateho Affair, provided the 
second key factor in Japan’s decision to strengthen its prohibition on insider 
trading. In Japan, pressure for change originating from outside Japan is 
known as gaiatsu, which translated literally means “foreign pressure.”86 
Takeuchi, discussing the then forthcoming amendments to the SEL 1948, 
referred to gaistsu and the Tateho Affair as being the two main reasons for 
the 1988 Amendments.87  
Takeuchi further acknowledged that because investors compete for 
information within the stock market, possession of inside information clearly 
creates an anti-competitive effect. He noted that while there had been no 
insider trading cases in Japan, there were thirty to forty a year in the United 
States. Despite isolated reports of insider trading in the last forty years, 
Takeuchi did not suggest that insider trading never occurs on the Japanese 
markets. On the contrary, he even joked that it was unbelievable that all 
investors on the Tokyo Stock Exchange were angels,88 and commented that 
there was pressure to amend the law from foreign critics who complained 
that as “the Japanese markets don’t regulate insider trading, it [Japan] is an 
insider’s heaven.”89 Takeuchi concluded that Japan had to amend its 
securities laws to avoid conflict with foreigners.90  
 
 
 85. See Securities Exchange Committee Report, supra note 84. 
 86. See Takeuchi (I), supra note 79, at 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 3-4. Japan is traditionally a country where people strive to avoid conflict. Therefore, in 
this case, Takeuchi perhaps suggests that, in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the United 
States over this issue, it was simply preferable to promulgate some legislation. See Noda, supra note 
64. 
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Takeuchi was not the only commentator to mention international 
pressure. Although a number of commentators acknowledged the trend in 
global financial markets towards strengthening provisions against insider 
trading, they did not specifically credit international pressure for the passage 
of the 1988 Amendments. However, those commentators continued to state 
that Japan should still take note of such developments when considering its 
own legislation.91 Indeed, it was noted that it was becoming more important 
to keep pace with international trends in regulation since Tokyo was now 
considered one of the three major stock markets in the world along with New 
York and London.92 
An April 1988 Shôji hômu [Commercial and Judicial Affairs] article 
discussing the February 1988 report submitted by the Securities Exchange 
Committee on ways to regulate insider trading, mentioned the Ivan Boesky 
scandal in the United States, and observed that the United Kingdom had 
recently strengthened its laws prohibiting insider trading.93 In particular, the 
author focused on the United Kingdom’s Company Securities (Insider 
Dealing) Act of 1985 and the Financial Services Act of 1986. The article 
noted that “various foreign countries are in the process of strengthening and 
improving the regulation of insider trading, and that this strengthening of the 
prohibition of insider trading has become an international trend.”94 Thus, in 
the minds of Japanese academics, the international trend toward prohibiting 
insider trading, gaiatsu and the Tateho Affair, provided the main raison 
d’être for strengthening the law.  
 
 
 91. Kazuo Nikawa, Insaidâ (naibusha) torihiki kisei no seibi [The maintenance of insider trading 
regulations], 1191 KINYÛ HÔMU JIJYÔ 34, 34 (1988) [author’s translation]. Several other articles 
published at the time noted that there was a growing trend in the international markets towards 
increasing or strengthening the regulation of insider trading. For instance: 
The number of countries that have passed insider trading regulations has increased, additionally 
international securities trading has also increased, as a result of this international environment the 
passing of insider trading laws has become an important issue.  
Setsu Tatsuta, Insaidâ torihiki kisei no shinrippô ni tsuite [Concerning the new insider trading 
regulations legislation], 1191 KINYÛ HÔMU JIJYO 39, 39 (1988) [author’s translation]. 
 92. See Nikawa, supra note 91, at 34. In March 1988, Ekonomisuto published three articles 
discussing the regulation of insider trading in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan in a 
special section entitled “Insaidâ tengoku” ni mesu wa hairu ka [Insider’s heaven: The scalpel is 
plunged in], 66 EKONOMISUTO 44 (1988) [author’s translation]. 
 93. Shigeru Kobayashi, Naibusha torihiki no kisei no arikata ni tsuite [Ways to regulate insider 
trading], 1141 SHÔJI HÔMU 13 (1988) [author’s translation]. 
 94. Id. 
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4. Non-Japanese Commentary 
Japanese commentators referred to the Western media as the source of 
much of the gaiatsu. Numerous examples of such negative press about 
insider trading in Japan appeared. For instance, some months before the 
Tateho Affair, Forbes published an article highly critical of the Japanese 
stock market, declaring that: “The Tokyo market is more like the U.S. market 
of sixty years ago, when what we call today stock rigging, insider dealing, 
painting the tape, buying pools, market manipulation still called the tune. 
Only in Japan, part of the rigging is done as government policy.”95 
Furthermore, commentators noted how ironic it was that the United States 
was not more vocal in critiquing the lack of regulation in Japan because as an 
occupying force after World War II, it had approved the enactment of 
Japan’s first insider trading laws.96 An article in the Journal of Financial 
Crime summed up the view that the Tateho Affair and pressure from the 
United States were responsible for the enactment of the 1988 Amendments: 
“Insider trading has historically been tolerated in Japan. Prominent securities 
market scandals, such as the Tateho Chemical case in 1987, and increasing 
U.S. criticism of Japanese market practices, led to the Japanese 
Government’s amendments of the Securities and Exchange Law in 1988.”97 
Even after the Japanese government had announced its intention to 
strengthen the prohibition of insider trading, the foreign media remained 
critical of the then proposed amendments to the SEL 1948. One source 
commented that the new proposed amendments were in effect pointless if 
“the authorities are not up to the task of surveillance.”98 The same 
commentator carried on to point out that even though the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange’s capitalization was a third larger than that of New York, it had 
only thirty-one monitoring staff while the securities bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance had fewer than 150, a stark contrast to the SEC in New York which 
at the time had a staff of 2,000.99 
As Japanese financial markets began to internationalize100 increased 
 
 
 95. Howard Rudnitsky et al., Land of the Rising Stocks, FORBES, May 18, 1987, at 139, 140. 
 96. See Whitner, supra note 49, at 15. 
 97. Philip Summe & Kimberly A. McCoy, Insider Trading Regulation: A Developing State's 
Perspective, 5 J. FIN. CRIME 311, 330 (1998).  
 98. See Holloway, supra note 62, at 95. 
 99. Id. at 95. 
 100. The first steps in the internationalization of the Japanese financial markets occurred in 1971, 
with the liberalization of yen-denominated bond issues abroad. However, the pace did not really pick 
up until the mid-1980s. In 1980, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was 
substantially revised, thus liberalizing international transactions. The U.S.-Japan Yen-Dollar 
Committee Report 1984 stressed the importance of the free movement of capital as well as open and 
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scrutiny from the Western media followed. The world perceived that the 
Japanese financial markets were a closed, unfair, and illiquid system that 
operated for the sole benefit of insiders. Numerous media reports covered 
this topic and the Tateho Affair cemented those opinions. The Japanese 
government was left with no alternative but to respond to the growing 
criticism.  
B. The 1988 Amendments 
On May 25, 1988 the Diet passed legislation amending the SEL 1948.101 
The 1988 Amendments updated reporting requirements as well as the core 
prohibition and penalty provisions. First, the reporting requirements for 
issuers were expanded under Article 154.102 In addition, Article 188 provided 
that a securities company whose client is a corporate insider must submit a 
report to the Ministry of Finance on behalf of that client.103 
Article 189 was amended to require the Ministry of Finance to provide 
information obtained under Article 188 if they determined that short-swing 
trading had occurred in breach of Article 189.104 Article 189 granted the 
alleged insider time to respond to the allegations first.105 Article 190, which 
previously only prohibited short swing sales of stock, was expanded to 
prohibit short swing sales of convertible bonds, bonds with warrants, 
warrants, and options.106 Articles 190-2 and 190-3 updated the provisions 
                                                                                                                         
 
liberal capital markets. In 1985, bond futures trading commenced, and in 1987 securities options 
trading commenced and the commercial paper market was introduced. See Oda, supra note 4, at 268-
70. 
 101. Shôken torihiki hô ichibu o kaisei suru hôritsu [Law amending in part the securities and 
exchange law], Law No. 75 of May 31, 1988. 
 102. SEL 1948, art. 154 (amended in 1988). Under the original Article 154, the Ministry of 
Finance could request the stock exchange to submit a report on a listed company. Under the 1988 
Amendments, the Ministry of Finance can make a direct request of any company listed on the stock 
exchange, as well as to the Stock Exchange itself, to submit a report or data. Furthermore, it empowers 
competent officials in the Ministry of Finance to conduct an inspection of the accounting books, 
documents, or other articles. 
 103. Failure to file such a report or providing false information in the report, is punishable by a 
maximum fine of three hundred thousand yen. However, this information is provided only to the 
Ministry of Finance, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for an action against an alleged insider by 
a corporation or one of its shareholders. Id. art. 188. 
 104. Id. art. 189, ¶¶ 4-9. 
 105. An alleged insider has, under Article 189(5), twenty days within which to file an objection 
with the Ministry of Finance. If such an objection is filed the Ministry of Finance will act as if no 
report had been filed in the first place under Article 188. However, there is a three hundred thousand 
yen maximum fine for filing a false objection. Furthermore, if the corporation fails to attempt to 
recover the short-swing profits within a certain period of time, the Ministry of Finance is then obliged 
to disclose the information to the public, allowing shareholders of the corporation in question to 
attempt to recover the short-swing profits. 
 106. Now Article 164 of the SEL 1948 (amended 2001). 
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prohibiting insider trading and trading by tender offer insiders 
respectively.107 Article 190-2 provides for the most fundamental 
prohibition—prohibiting a corporate insider from dealing in her company’s 
stocks (or bonds, warrants, or options) which are listed on a stock exchange 
when in possession of material non-public information.108 Material 
information was defined as being that information deemed material enough 
to affect the investment decisions of investors.109 Article 190-2 also restricted 
the sale of stock by tippees, who were defined as people who have received 
material facts from either a corporate-related party or a former corporate 
related party. Tippees were subject to the same restrictions as insiders.110 
Former corporate related parties are defined as any person who falls into one 
of the definitions provided by the law.111 These parties are constructively a 
part of the organization within one year of ending their relationship with the 
organization.112  
Article 190-3 was similar in nature to Rule 14e-3 in the United States, 
prohibiting corporate related parties defined in Article 190-2 of an acquiring 
corporation from dealing in securities of a takeover target based on 
knowledge of a tender offer obtained through their relationship with the 
acquiring corporation. No deals can be made until such information has been 
disclosed to the public, as provided under Article 190-2.113 Finally, Article 
200, the penalty provision, was updated to include a maximum six month 
prison sentence and/or a maximum fine of half a million yen for a breach of 
either Article 190-2 or 190-3. Disclosure to the public was defined as 
 
 
 107. The provisions are now in Article 166 of the SEL (amended 2001). 
 108. SEL 1948, art. 190-2 ¶ 1. Paragraph 1 of Article 190-2 then defines corporate related parties 
of which there are five major types: (i) those directors, agents, or other employees of the corporation 
who have obtained material facts during the course of their duties; (ii) principal shareholders where 
they have obtained material facts due to their right to inspect the corporation’s accounts; (iii) those 
who due to their supervisory authority over the corporation have obtained material facts during the 
course of their duties; (iv) those who have contracts with the corporation and have obtained material 
facts as a result of entering into such contracts or in the course of performing such contracts (e.g., 
lawyers, printers, accountants); and (v) others from a legal entity falling into categories (ii) to (iv) if 
they have obtained the material facts during the course of their duties. Id. Items 1-5. 
 109. A list of such events is then provided, including such events as the issuance of new stock, 
mergers, differences between actual and estimated sales or profits (if deemed sufficiently great to 
affect the investment decisions of investors), and the catch all clause of any other important facts 
relating to management, business or assets of the corporation that would materially affect the 
investment decisions of the public. Id. ¶ 2. 
 110. Id. ¶ 3. 
 111. Id. ¶ 1. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Paragraph 2 of Article 190-3 defines information concerning a tender offer as information 
that a corporation intends to make or withdraw a tender offer for another corporation. However, some 
information may be exempt where it is deemed not to be material enough to affect an investor’s 
investment decisions. Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 10 of 1989, art. 7. 
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information made public by the corporation as defined by the Cabinet 
Ordinance of 1965.114 
C. The Anatomy of Tatemae Revisited 
This new regulatory regime for insider trading marked a significant 
departure from the previous stance held by the Japanese authorities. The 
regulations reflect Japan’s desire to have its financial markets viewed as 
being on a par with those of London and New York. Along with Tokyo’s 
rapid internationalization the reality was that the Japanese government, in the 
light of the Tateho Affair and overseas criticism, could no longer turn a blind 
eye to the issue of insider trading.  
There is little doubt from the analysis of events leading to the 1988 
Amendments that they were once again motivated in great part by a need to 
placate critics. Japan’s failure to set up an independent watchdog to police 
the markets and enforce the new law further reinforces the notion that 
tatemae, rather than honne, was the driving force behind the decision to re-
regulate insider trading in 1988. However, the fact that a domestic scandal set 
the train of events in motion suggests that the Japanese government was 
beginning to internalize the notion that insider trading needed to be addressed 
more seriously.  
Some Japanese academics referenced the oft-cited Western justifications 
for the prohibition such as fairness and confidence in the markets, to lend 
support for establishing more effective securities statutes. Notwithstanding 
that, Baum hit the nail on the head when he pinpointed reputation (read 
tatemae) as a prime motivation for the regulation.115 Lu was more blunt when 
she argued that the 1988 Amendments “created very strict-looking rules in 
order to convince foreigners that the Japanese market is a fair one.”116 
 
 
 114. Cabinet Ordinance No. 321 of 1965, art. 30 (amended by Cabinet Ordinance No. 23 of 1989). 
The Ordinance states that a chief executive officer (CEO) satisfies the public disclosure requirement 
when the CEO or an agent of the corporation provides the information to at least two different news 
media sources, followed by a lapse of at least twelve hours. Whether or not the news media then 
choose to broadcast that news is irrelevant. 
 115. See Baum, supra note 83, at 20. 
 116. See Lu, supra note 29, at 237. 
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IV. FROM TATEMAE TO HONNE 
A. Post-1988 Revisions 
In 1992, the provisions concerning insider trading were moved from 
Articles 188-190 to Articles 163-167 of the SEL.117 Administration of the 
SEL, which has been moved several times, currently lies with the Prime 
Minister.118 The revisions made to the law since 1988 fall into three main 
categories. Firstly, the scope of the law has been gradually widened. The 
revisions not only expand the types of financial instruments covered,119 but 
the amendments also broaden the range of people to whom it is applicable120 
and the markets which fall within it.121 Second, the definition of material 
information, now contained in Article 166(2), has been steadily widened and 
redefined, making it a more comprehensive, and consequently more 
complex, definition than at the time of the 1988 Amendments.122 Third, the 
revisions significantly enhanced penalties. “Natural” persons convicted of 
SEL violations are subject to up to three years imprisonment, and/or a fine of 
three million yen (previously six months and half a million yen 
respectively).123 For legal entities, the penalty was increased to a fine not 
exceeding three hundred million yen (previously half a million yen).124 In 
 
 
 117. Law No. 73 of 1992. Revisions to the law became effective from July 20, 1992. 
 118. From July 1, 2000, the administration of the SEL was changed from the Minister of Finance 
(Ôkura daijin) to the Financial Reconstruction Commission (Kinyû saisei iinkai), then on January 6, 
2001 administration of the SEL was again changed, this time to the Prime Minister (Naikaku sôri 
daijin). 
 119. On December 1, 1998, the definition of the instruments covered was expanded to include 
securities based on a futures index, options, foreign markets’ futures, and over-the-counter derivatives. 
 120. The expanded definition also included the following people: executives at a parent company 
where that company holds ten percent or more of the subsidiary or contractors; a contractor in 
negotiations with either the parent or the child company; and any executive within the tippee’s 
company where the tippee received the information from the tipper about the tipper’s company 
through a business relationship. From July 1, 2000, anyone related to a subsidiary company fell within 
the scope of the prohibition.  
 121. From July 20, 1992, provisions were expanded to cover the over-the-counter markets.  
 122. Changes were also made to the definition of material information: from April 1, 1994, any 
knowledge pertaining to the acquisition of or divestiture of any part of the business; from October 10, 
1994, information relating to a company’s buyback of its own stock; from June 1, 1997, information 
concerning the delisting of a stock from a stock exchange; from December 1, 1998, information 
relating to the reduction of capital through buyback, a foreign company repurchasing overseas, a 
business loss and a change in the prospective dividend; from October 1, 1999, information relating to 
an exchange or transfer of securities and from July 1, 2000, information to do with any company 
within a group to which the company belongs, where they know the actual results will be different 
from the estimate and for companies listed on the stock exchange any information concerning a 
subsidiary. 
 123. SEL 1948, art. 198 (amended 2000). 
 124. The penalties were increased on December 30, 1997. 
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1999, the penalties were changed yet again, this time providing for a 
forfeiture of the proceeds received by the insider via illegal insider trading.125 
Although no single revision is in itself particularly startling, when taken 
together as a whole they serve to create a relatively comprehensive regime. 
Certainly, if the rationale for the adoption of the original amendments in 
1988 was to placate foreign and domestic critics, but with no real intention of 
enforcing them, the same cannot be said for the subsequent amendments. The 
later revisions clearly demonstrate that Japan is serious about enforcing the 
law. These post-1988 amendments can serve no other useful purpose than to 
more clearly define the scope of the prohibition and increase convictions. 
Empirical evidence from the case law bears this out. The fact that the law 
now falls under the direct auspices of the Prime Minister further reinforces 
the impression that enforcement of insider trading law has gained 
prominence in the political agenda. 
B. Stock Market Surveillance Institutions—Towards a Japanese SEC 
Despite the promulgation of the 1988 Amendments, Japan found itself 
once again with a lacuna because it lacked an effective watchdog along the 
lines of the SEC in the United States. As discussed above the Japanese 
version of the SEC was abolished soon after it was established, and replaced 
by a totally ineffective regime.126 As a result, there were no successful 
prosecutions for insider trading for over forty years. Even though the 1988 
Amendments strengthened the law, absent an independent watchdog, there 
was no real means for enforcement. 
This led the Economist, in 1990, nearly two years after the 1988 
Amendments came into force, to suggest that insider trading was not taken 
seriously as a crime and that it was just as common a practice as speeding.127 
The article stated that the police decided to crack down on insider trading by 
enforcing the new amendments to the SEL because the prosecutor’s office 
seemed incapable of doing so. 
However, in 1991, the situation began to change. First, the government 
created the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) in 
1992. The next step involved the establishment of the Financial Supervisory 
Agency in 1998. The commitment to enforcement finally came of age with 
the birth of the Financial Services Agency in 2000. 
 
 
 125. Forfeiture was provided for in the amendments taking effect from December 1, 1998. 
 126. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission 
Following a series of loss compensation scandals in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Advisory Committee to the Prime Minister recommended in 
the autumn of 1991 that a watchdog independent from the Ministry of 
Finance be set up to monitor the financial markets. According to Aoki, the 
Ministry of Finance’s unofficial administrative guidance was largely to 
blame for the scandals.128 On July 20, 1992 the Shôken torihiki tô kanshi 
iinkai [Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission] was officially 
established under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. While the SESC 
has always been located within either the Ministry of Finance (1992-98), the 
Financial Supervisory Agency (1998-2000), or the Financial Services 
Agency (2000-present), it works independently of them. The SESC’s 
Chairperson and Commissioners are appointed directly by the Prime 
Minister’s office. The Chairperson of the SESC described the SESC’s 
purpose as follows: “Our mission is to ensure fair transactions in the 
securities and financial futures markets, thereby maintaining the confidence 
of investors in these markets.”129 
The SESC serves three functions: compliance inspections, market 
surveillance, and enforcement. The SESC has three options open to it to deal 
with any misconduct or fraud.130 First, it can make a recommendation for an 
administrative disciplinary action to the Financial Services Agency.131 
Second, it can file an accusation with the public prosecutor, who may then 
take up the matter.132 And third, it can make a policy proposal to the 
Financial Services Agency.133 
Since its establishment, despite being short staffed when compared to the 
SEC, the SESC has been relatively active.134 According to its 2001 Annual 
 
 
 128. Hiroko Aoki, The New Regulatory and Supervisory Architecture of Japan’s Financial 
Markets, 12 Z. JAPAN R. 101, 102 (2001).  
 129.  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2001/2002 3 
(2002), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/reports/re2001pamph/pamphlet_2001.pdf. 
 130. SESC, Who We Are: History and Functions, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/ 
aboutsesc01.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. According to Aoki, the Japanese FSA had a total staff of 776, including 112 at the SESC as 
of January 2001, whereas the SEC in the United States had around 3,000. Moreover, she states that the 
other federal agencies have close to 10,000 inspectors whereas the CFTC has nearly 500. See Aoki, 
supra note 128, at 106.  
 An article in the Japan Times noted that: 
The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission has a staff of only 255, which is 
equivalent to a mere 8 percent of the 3,285 people employed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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Report (covering the period from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002), the SESC 
has brought a total of sixteen cases of insider trading since its inception in 
135
 
The number of investigations carried out by the SESC relating to insider 
trading has increased dramatically over the past five years. The SESC 
investigated 236, 190, and 249 suspected cases of insider trading in its 1999, 
2000 and 2001 reporting periods respectively.137 In addition, during the 2001 
reporting period it investigated 112 cases of suspected price manipulation 
and thirty-one cases of suspected rumor spreading.138 Over the past two 
years, the SESC has also participated in so called “Internet Surf Days” 
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Commission. In fiscal 2002, the SESC had an annual budget of only $23.33 million, or 5.3 percent 
of the SEC’s $437.9 million budget. 
Yashio Nakamura, Stocks Won’t Recover Unless Regulators Get Serious About Oversight, JAPAN 
TIMES, June 16, 2003, at 13. 
 135. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, HEISEI JÛSAN NENDO HAN NENJI 
KÔHYÔ [HEISEI 13TH YEAR OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORT] 9 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/ 
sesc/reports/n_13/n_13a.pdf [hereinafter SESC Annual Report 2000]. 
 136. Data compiled from SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, HEISI JÛNI 
NENDO HAN NENJI KÔHYÔ: FUZOKU SHIRYÔ [HEISEI 12TH YEAR OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORT: DATA 
APPENDIX] 45 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/reports/n_12/n_12b.pdf [hereinafter 
SESC 2000 Report Data Appendix]; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION, 
HEISEI JÛSAN NENDO HAN NENJI KÔHYÔ FUZOKU SHIRYÔ [HEISEI 13TH YEAR OFFICIAL ANNUAL 
REPORT: DATA APPENDIX] 69 (2002), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/reports/n_13/n_13b.pdf 
[hereinafter SESC 2001 Report Data Appendix]. 
 137. See SESC 2001 Report Data Appendix, supra note 136, at 69. 
 138. Id.  
1992.  
Diagram 2: Number of investigations of insider trading carried out by the 
SESC 1995–2001136 
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organized by the International Organization of Securities Regulators, aimed 
at uncovering fraudulent schemes involving the Internet.139 Furthermore, the 
SESC cooperates with various Japanese Self-Regulatory Organizations that 
also monitor the markets for violations of self-imposed rules. 
The establishment of the SESC alone is remarkable because it 
demonstrates that Japan is taking the concept of independent inspection of its 
financial markets seriously. An effective regime against insider trading 
cannot exist without a means of monitoring the market to ensure that all 
participants follow the rules. Thus, the SESC is a crucial element in the 
creation of an effective regime against insider trading.  
A genuine regulatory enforcement mechanism represents a fundamental 
change of policy over the previous four decades. Previously, despite statutory 
prohibitions there were no successful prosecutions involving insider trading. 
And, largely thanks to the lack of an independent watchdog, only two cases 
were brought in the four decades from 1948 to 1988.  
2. The Financial Supervisory Agency 
As part of a program of reform set in motion by then Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto to revitalize Japan, and following the publication of the 
Keizai hakusho [Economic White Paper] in July 1996 (1996 Economic 
White Paper), the government announced Japan’s equivalent to the United 
Kingdom’s Big-Bang.140 
The 1996 Economic White Paper warned that Japan’s economic system 
needed reformation if it was to move from a “catch-up” based economy to a 
“post catch-up” based economy.141 In response to the 1996 Economic White 
Paper’s comments, the Ministry of Finance issued a document entitled 
Financial System Reform: Toward the Early Achievement of Reform on June 
13, 1997. The paper suggested that the foundation for the Japanese Big-Bang 
should be based upon the creation of a “free, fair, and global” market.142 The 
 
 
 139. Id. at 82-83.  
 140. HEISEI 8 NEN NENDO KEIZAI HOKOKU (KEIZAI HAKUSHO) [HEISEI 8TH YEAR YEARLY 
ECONOMIC REPORT (Economic White Paper)] (July 1996), at http://wp.cao.go.jp/zenbon/keizai/wp-
je96/wp-je96-000i1.html (last visited June 8, 2003). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Ministry of Finance, Financial System Reform–Toward the Early Achievement of Reform, 
June 13, 1997, at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb32.htm/. Free, fair and global were 
defined as a liberal market under market principles; a ‘transparent and reliable market and an 
international and advanced market’ respectively. For a general background see Ministry of Finance, 
About the Financial System Reform (Japanese version of Big Bang), at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/ 
big-bang/ebb2.htm (last visited July 2, 2002). Interestingly, they detail London’s Big Bang as their 
model. See Ministry of Finance, The Originator of the Big Bang, England, at http://www.mof.go.jp/ 
english/big-bang/ebb24.htm (last visited July 2, 2002). 
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paper noted the increased number of new financial products in U.S. and 
European markets, and stressed similar enhancements of Japanese financial 
markets to “prevent its possible hollowing out.”143  
Following a number of scandals involving the Ministry of Finance in the 
early 1990s, the Jûsen Scandal of 1995 in particular, critics attacked the 
Ministry of Finance.144 Partly in response to these criticisms, the government 
decided to divest the Ministry of Finance of some of its powers. As a result, 
in June 1998, the Diet established the new independent Financial Supervisory 
Agency as an external bureau of the Cabinet Office.145 The government 
effectively transferred the Ministry of Finance’s supervisory and inspection 
authority, and the SESC, to the newly created Financial Supervisory Agency.  
3. The Financial Services Agency 
On July 1, 2000, the Financial Supervisory Agency and the Ministry of 
Finance’s Financial Planning Department merged to form the Financial 
Services Agency.146 The SESC moved to the new Financial Services Agency 
as well. Although physically located on the Financial Services Agency’s 
premises, the SESC remains independent. The commissioner of the Financial 
Services Agency listed six basic policy principles of the new agency: 
establishment of a reliable and vigorous financial system, development of a 
state of the art financial infrastructure, development and proper 
implementation of regulations to protect users, ensuring transparency and 
fairness in financial administration based on clear rules, enhancement of 
expertise and foresight of the staff and improving the administrative 
structure, and the reinforcement of cooperation with foreign regulators and 
contribution to international rule-making.147 
Despite a rather complicated birth, Japan now has an independent 
watchdog for the financial services industry with responsibilities that include 
market surveillance and, through the SESC, control of insider trading. As a 
result, Japan is now back in the situation that GHQ had originally intended 
 
 
 143. See Financial System Reform—Toward the Early Achievement of Reform, supra note 142. 
 144. The Jûsen Scandal is cited by Aoki as a primary reason for the collapse of the Ministry of 
Finance. See Aoki, supra note 128, at 101-03. Oda names of the loss-compensation scandal of 1991 as 
a motive for the reformation of the Ministry of Finance. See Oda, supra note 4, at 287. 
 145. Kinyû kantokuchô setchi hô [Law establishing the financial supervisory agency], Law No. 
101 of 1997. 
 146. Kinyûchô setchi hô [Law establishing the financial services agency], Law No. 130 of 1998 
(amended 2000). 
 147. Statement by the Commissioner–On the Establishment of the Financial Services Agency, 
Provisional Translation July 3, 2000, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/danwa/danwae/20000703-1e.html (last 
visited June 13, 2002).  
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some half a century earlier. This time, the pressure for reform originated 
more from within the Japanese system rather than from foreign duress.  
The catalyst for the reform of Japan’s financial system and, in turn, the 
Ministry of Finance was triggered by the realization that Japan needed to 
reorganize its economic model. Although many critics made reference to 
“hollowing out” and the need to compete, rather than to silence foreign 
critics, the changes were the product of the recognition that in order for the 
Japanese economy to recover it needed to undergo fundamental structural 
change. This realization marks the beginning of the second phase in the 
development of Japanese insider trading law. 
4. Self-regulatory Organizations 
In addition to the SESC, a number of self-regulatory organizations exist 
to police securities markets and the ethical conduct of members. Such 
organizations include the Japan Securities Dealers Association, the Financial 
Futures Association, the Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange, 
and the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  
The Tokyo Stock Exchange’s surveillance department, known as the 
Department of Market Surveillance and Compliance has the power to 
investigate suspicious trades and then impose penalties on the company in 
question or refer the case to the SESC.148 The data released by the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange indicates a similar trend in the growth of insider trading 
investigations when compared to SESC figures. 
From 1995 to 2000, the number of suspicious trades doubled and the 
number that resulted in investigations increased by approximately three 
hundred and fifty percent.149 The Tokyo Stock Exchange also publishes 
guidelines and circulations that member companies are obliged to comply 
with.150 A number of the guidelines are related to the prohibition on insider 
trading. 
 
 
 148. See SESC Annual Report 2001/2002, supra note 129, at 43-44. 
 149. See Diagram 3, infra. 
 150. See, e.g., Naibusha torihiki no mizen bôshi no tame no ryûi jikô [Notice concerning the 
prevention of insider trading] (Tokyo Stock Exchange, November 2000) reprinted in TOKYO SHÔKEN 
TORIHIKI JÔ [TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE], KONPURAIANSU REPÔTO [COMPLIANCE REPORT] 66-69 
(2001), at http://www.tse.or.jp/comp_report/compliance.pdf. Insaidâ bôshi he tsûtatsu [Notification of 
the prevention of insiders], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 2, 2000 [author’s translation]. See also Jôjôgaisha 
no kankeisha ni yoru jishakabu no baibai torihiki ni tsuite [Using insider information: Avoidance of 
unfair transactions] (Tokyo Stock Exchange, Nov. 17, 1972); Naibu jôhô o riyô shita fukôsei torihiki 
no bôshi ni tsuite [Concerning the transactions by company insiders in their company’s stock] (Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, June 17, 1987); Naibusha torihiki bôshi no tettei ni tsuite [Regarding the complete 
prevention of insider trading] (Tokyo Stock Exchange, Aug. 26, 1988); Naibusha torihiki bôshi no 
tettei ni tsuite [Regarding the complete prevention of insider trading] (Tokyo Stock Exchange, Mar. 
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Diagram 3: Number of Cases Where Insider Trading was Suspected and 
C. Case Law 
Since the promulgation of the 1988 Amendments, there have been 
relatively few prosecutions for insider trading compared to the United States. 
However, when compared the period from 1948 to 1988, there has been a 
marked difference in prosecution rates. There have been sixteen reported 
cases since the new amendments came into effect, including two opinions 
from the Supreme Court.152  
For enforcement to succeed, the frequency of prosecution and the 
imposition of penalties are of greater interest, and arguably more importance 
than the raw number of cases. Despite the small data sample, there is a clear 
trend towards increasing the penalties imposed for violations of the law. As 
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24, 1995). 
 151. See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 150, at 28. 
 152. See SHIN INSAIDÂ TORIHIKI KISEI GAIDOBUKKU [NEW INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS 
GUIDEBOOK] 149-63 (2001) and SESC 2001 Report Data Appendix, supra note 136, at 26-34, for 
details of the sixteen cases. Shortly after the enactment of the 1988 Amendments, a large-scale case of 
insider trading occurred on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In the so-called Shin nihon seitetsu-Sangyô 
seiki jiken [New Japan Steel Sangyô seiki Affair] fifteen employees of Sangyô seiki and nineteen 
employees of New Japan Steel acquired shares shortly before an announcement of a tie-up between the 
two companies that boosted the stock price. The Tokyo Stock Exchange investigated and concluded 
that it would have been a chargeable offence under the newly amended insider trading law except for 
the fact that the law had not yet come into force. See HIDEAKI KUBORI, INSAIDÂ TORIHIKI KISEI TO 
KABUNUSHIKAI [INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS MEETINGS] 6-7 (1989). See also 
Lu, supra note 29, at 197-98. 
Investigated by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 1995 – 2000151 
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Diagram 4 shows, in the first few judgments, the courts levied relatively 
modest fines. By the mid-1990s, as the financial Big-Bang occurred in Japan, 
the courts meted out more severe penalties. Usually, the penalties included 
six-month jail sentences, suspended for three years. Finally, in 2000, in the 
Nihon M.I.C. case, the Tokyo District Court sentenced the accused to an 
unsuspended six months in prison. This case is currently on appeal to the 
Supreme Court.153 
The distribution of the sentencing data for insider trading violations in 
Diagram 4 reveals that the application of the law changed in the mid-1990s. 
The number of cases has steadily increased, albeit from a very low starting 
point. And although the number of cases is still small compared to the United 
States, Japan is fast approaching Europe’s level of enforcement. Indeed, if 
the present trend continues, Japan may well surpass Europe’s level of 
enforcement. Imposition of prison sentences and profit forfeitures began in 
1997, the year of the Big-Bang in the Japanese financial markets—a 
remarkable coincidence.154 With the unsuspended six month sentence in the 
Nihon M.I.C. case, the trend shows that Japan’s establishment of a securities 
market watchdog has begun to bear fruit.155  
 
 
 153. See SESC 2001 Report Data Appendix, supra note 136, at 30.  
 154. This is not necessarily the case, since forfeiture only became an option with a revision of the 
law in 1997. 
 155. Although a six month sentence, suspended for three years, may seem lenient, it should be 
noted that prison sentences in Japan tend to be shorter than in the West as a general rule. For instance, 
in a recent rape case a Japanese court sentenced a U.S. serviceman to less than three years in jail. In 
the United Kingdom, there is a mandatory life sentence. On that basis, by Japanese standards an eight 
month or one year prison sentence for insider trading would be considered a very severe sentence. 
Airman gets 32 months for rape in Okinawa, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20020329a2.htm. See also SDF officer gets 3-1/2 
years, not Five, for Raping Teen, JAPAN TIMES, July 31, 2001, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010731a9.htm. In the latter case the prosecutors had only sought a five-year 
prison term. 
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Diagram 4: Sentencing Distribution in Insider Trading Cases in Japan 
The Japanese Supreme Court first addressed insider trading in the Nippon 
shôji kabushiki kaisha case.157 The defense presented an interesting 
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 156. Data complied from SESC 2000 Report Data Appendix, supra note 136, at 40-48. 
 157. Judgment of February 16, 1999, Saikosai (Supreme Court) (53-2 KEIJISHUU 111) [author’s 
translation]. Numerous English and Japanese language reports and comments on this case were 
published after the ruling.  
 Japanese language sources include: Insaidâ torihiki jiken jôkoku shin hanketsu (saisanban heisei 
11.2.16) [Insider trading case’s final appeal (Supreme Court, Third Circuit, February 16, 1999)], 1671 
HANREI JIHÔ 45 (1999) [author’s translation]; Kuniji Shibahara, Nippon shôji kabushiki insaidâ 
torihiki jiken saikôsai hanketsu no kentô [An examination of the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Nippon Shôji case], 1525 SHÔJI HÔMU 56 (1999) [author’s translation]; Takashi Nonoue, Shôken 
torihiki hôjô no insaidâ torihiki kisei (shôken torihiki hô 166 jô) ni kansuru hatsu no saikôsai hanketsu 
ni tsuite [Regarding the first Supreme Court judgment relating to the regulation of insider trading 
(Securities and Exchange Law article 166)], 52 HÔRITSU NO HIROBA 54 (1999) [author’s translation]; 
Takashi Nonoue, Insaidâ torihiki kisei ni kansuru hatsu no saikôsai hanketsu [Regarding the Supreme 
Court’s first judgment relating to insider trading regulation], 1521 SHÔJI HÔMU 12 (1999) [author’s 
translation]; Saikin no saiban dôkô, Nippon shôji kabushiki insaidâ torihiki jiken jôkoku shinhanketsu 
[The judgment of the final appeal of the Nippon Shôji insider trading case], 182 SHIRYOBAN SHÔJI 
HÔMU 212 (1999) [author’s translation]; Tokuya Shinatani, Shôken torihiki hô 166jô 2kô 4gô no 
kaishaku [An examination of Securities and Exchange Law article 166(2)(4)], 1154 JURISTO 87 (1999) 
[author’s translation]; Saikôsai, insaidâ torihiki ni kanshite hatsuhandan [The Supreme Court’s first 
judgement regarding insider trading], 1152 JURISTO 4 (1999) [author’s translation]. 
1990 – 2001156 
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argument, noting that the government indicted their client on October 14, 
1994, just two days before the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions conference, to be held October 16-22, 1994, in Japan was to 
commence. The defense claimed their client was being made a scapegoat by 
the Japanese authorities in order to avoid international criticism that Japan 
was an “insider’s heaven.”158 It is hard to substantiate such claims—it could 
have been a genuine case of coincidence. However, the timing of the 
indictment suggests that placating foreign critics may well have been a factor 
in the decision to prosecute. 
The Nippon Shôji case however, was initiated in 1994, before the 
Japanese Big-Bang and the turning point noted above. Since the 1996 
Economic White Paper, the case law clearly demonstrates Japan’s increasing 
determination to crack down on insider trading. The increased prosecutions 
and stiffer penalties reflect a change in philosophy with regard to insider 
trading. The creation of an independent watchdog, the gradual expansion of 
the law prohibiting insider trading, and the increasing enforcement of that 
law indicates that the government has developed a real desire to tackle the 
issue.  
D. Post-bubble Blues 
Events of the last decade suggest that Japan has adopted a new 
philosophy of regulation. The incremental but important revisions to the 
prohibition since the early 1990s coupled with the creation of an independent 
watchdog and the ever increasing frequency of cases indicate that Japan has 
developed a serious desire to enforce its insider trading prohibition. 
The driving force behind the apparent shift in the underlying rationale for 
regulation from tatemae to honne, is arguably the fundamental readjustment 
of the Japanese economic model, which began in the mid-1990s. After its 
economic bubble burst in 1992, Japan entered into what has now been 
sometimes termed as “the lost decade”159—a quagmire of anemic growth, 
                                                                                                                         
 
 For English language sources, see Japan: Supreme Court to Hear 1st Insider Trading Case, 
DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 1, 1998; Japan: Court Rules Info on Side Effects of Drug Enabled Insider 
Trading, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 24, 1999; Japan: Top Court Sends Back Insider Trading Case, KYODO 
NEWS, Feb. 16, 1999. 
 158. Jôkoku shuisho (hikokunin gawa) [Appeal from the defendants side to the Supreme Court], 
Feb. 26, 1998, Heisei 9 nen (a) dai 1232 gô (Case number (a)) 1232, 1997), reprinted in 182 
SHIRYOBAN SHÔJI HÔMU 212, 227 (1999) [author’s translation]. 
 159. What Ails Japan, ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 2002, at 3; Masaru Hayami, Revitalization of Japan’s 
economy, Speech at the Japanese Economic Research Center, Tokyo (May 29, 2000), available at 
http://www.bis.org. 
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deflation and frequent recession.160 This economic crisis sparked 
fundamental reforms of Japan’s economic model, with the Hashimoto 
administration initiating the financial sector reforms set out in the 1996 
Economic White Paper and the subsequent Big-Bang. 
A major consequence of these reforms has been the breakdown of the 
keiretsu system and its accompanying economic model.161 First, as a result of 
falling asset prices after the collapse of the bubble economy and the capital 
adequacy ratio requirements of the Bank for International Settlements, many 
Japanese banks found that they had to sell their share holdings in order to 
raise capital. Second, banks are required to follow the so-called five percent 
rule, which holds that generally a financial institution may not hold more 
than five percent of any one particular corporation’s stock.162 As various 
banks merged they found themselves with holdings in excess of five percent 
and have consequently been forced to reduce holdings to comply with the 
rule. This has contributed to the unraveling of the cross-share holding 
structure of the keiretsu and has thus hastened their demise. And third, 
opening competition for financial services between banks and securities 
companies led to the collapse of the convoy system, further limiting the 
financial industry’s ability to maintain the keiretsu system.163 
As the keiretsu structures break down, companies will increasingly turn to 
the financial markets rather than a keiretsu group financial institution in order 
to raise capital. Furthermore, banks weakened as a result of bad loans from 
the bubble are not able to lend money as easily as before. Therefore, the 
general trend in Japan is towards an increased use of direct rather than 
indirect financing. This trend originated in the 1980s, but the collapse of the 
bubble has further accelerated it.164 The increasing reliance on financial 
 
 
 160. Two of the major problems which beset the Japanese economy are the banks’ non-
performing loans and deflation. The banks had made loans to companies, often within their keiretsu 
grouping, secured on assets, the value of which were greatly inflated during the bubble. As asset prices 
fell the banks found themselves with increasing bad loans. Since corporate bankruptcy is generally 
discouraged in Japan, the banks have found themselves carrying approximately ¥150 trillion in bad 
loans. None of the numerous efforts to clean up the banking sector have so far completely solved the 
problem. See Trickle Down Pain, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2003. In addition, deflation effectively lowers 
wages which in turn discourages investment and spending, further contributing to the economic 
downturn. See Heading Down, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2003. 
 161. Mindset, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1999, at 71. 
 162. Dokusen kinshi hô [Anti-Monopoly Law], Law No. 54 of Apr. 14, 1947, art. 11. There has 
however, been much debate over this rule. See, e.g., Tokushû: Ginkô no kabushiki hoyû kisei ha 
hitsuyô ka [Special: Are the rules concerning banks shareholdings necessary], KINYÛ ZAISEI JIHÔ, 
June 4, 2001, at 10-27. 
 163. See Karaki, supra note 56, at 356-60. Karaki documents the end of the convoy system 
pinpointing the law allowing banks to start engaging in the securities business, albeit in a limited way, 
as the “landmark” change. 
 164. See Diagram 1, supra. In fact, as Oda documents, the trend towards direct financing, which 
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markets as a source of capital makes it ever more important that those 
markets are viewed as fair, transparent and liquid. This is because investors 
are wary of markets that are considered immature and/or are rife with 
corruption, market manipulation and insider trading.165 It has been argued 
that a prohibition on insider trading is an important part of the package of 
regulations necessary for a successful stock market.166 
Thus at a minimum, it is vital that potential investors at least perceive the 
markets as being fair and transparent. And the Japanese government, in 
recognition of this situation, commendably pushed through the Big-Bang 
reforms and strengthened the insider trading prohibition–reforms that 
indicate an understanding that the economic model must change in order for 
the Japanese economy to remain competitive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that initially, the underlying rationale for the 
prohibition of insider trading in Japan was one of tatemae–the prohibition 
having been forced upon Japan as a precondition for reopening its stock 
                                                                                                                         
 
began in the mid-1980s, was one of the contributory factors to the economic bubble in the late 1980s. 
The shift from indirect to direct finance in Japan, especially to heavy reliance on equity finance, 
resulted in excess liquidity, which was often used to invest in real property and securities. The low 
cost of raising funds abroad and low interest rates in Japan made this possible. In this frenzy of 
equity finance, some companies came to be involved in speculation in the securities market, 
instead of pursuing profit from their primary business. This state of affairs, dubbed the “bubble 
economy,” naturally did not last long. 
See Oda, supra note 4, at 255. 
 165. Discussing developing states eager to promote their financial markets, Summe & McCoy 
state that: “If these developing states hope to attract foreign capital, particularly American capital, it is 
likely that their governments will need to construct a regulatory environment which corresponds to 
foreign investors’ notions of how a market should function.” See Summe & McCoy, supra note 97, at 
311. To wit, much has been made of the fact that China’s stock markets are still immature because, 
among other factors, insider trading is not adequately regulated. See Trish Saywell, Foreign Fund 
Managers Scrambling into China, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 4, 2000, at 71; China Securities Regulator 
Urges Honesty, Virtue–Report, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 27, 2000; Sophie Roell, Decade Later, 
China Stk Mkts Still Fac Challenges, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Dec. 18, 2000. 
 166. There has been much debate over the relative merits of bank-centered versus stock market 
centered capital markets. It has been argued that capital markets that are bank-centered are better able 
to monitor management, whereas those that are market centered have weaker monitoring but greater 
liquidity. Bernard Black conversely argues that: “stock-market-centered capital markets provide strong 
information disclosure and control of self-dealing—monitoring dimensions for which bank-centered 
capital markets are often weaker.” Black further maintains that an enforced ban on insider trading, 
while not absolutely vital to the success of a stock market, will certainly contribute to a stronger 
market. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 781, 785 (2001). Recent research suggests that a prohibition on insider trading that 
is actually enforced tends to raise share prices by about five percent, which appears to support Black’s 
contentions. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. OF FIN. 
75 (2002). 
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exchange. The subsequent detoothing of the law and its utter failure to be 
enforced can be ascribed to a transplant failure. The law was transplanted 
into a country with an entirely different historical, cultural and socio-
economic background from the country from which the law originated. It is 
not surprising then that the law failed to take root. Japan lacked the context to 
successfully drive the enforcement and development of the law. An analysis 
of the events leading to the adoption of the 1988 Amendments, shows that 
they were clearly enacted as a reaction to the Tateho Affair and to placate 
foreign and domestic critics. 
Since the mid-1990s however, Japan found itself in an economic situation 
not dissimilar to that of the United States in the 1930s, the very context in 
which the original prohibition of insider trading was first enacted. Indeed, 
this changed context allowed, demanded even, that the law be strengthened 
and enforced. And as such the regulation of insider trading has been taken 
more seriously and is no longer being treated exclusively as a matter of 
tatemae designed to placate Westerners. 
However, can one therefore conclude, a fortiori, that just because Japan 
has both strengthened and enforced the law that what was once tatemae has 
now become honne? Yes and no. On the one hand, the emerging pattern of 
enforcement and strengthening of the prohibition indicates Japan’s desire to 
tackle the issue. On the other hand, there is little concrete evidence to suggest 
that the newfound enthusiasm for enforcing the prohibition of insider trading 
is anything more than skin-deep. Certainly in order for its financial markets 
to successfully drive its economic growth, Japan has recognized that those 
markets need to be seen as being fair and transparent. Here the evidence 
points to a shift in the underlying philosophy of regulation from tatemae to 
honne: there is an honest desire to be perceived to be a fair and transparent 
market. However, has Japan developed a deep-seated belief that insider 
trading is malum per se and as such ought to be “legislated out of 
existence”?167 No, and absent a sharp economic shock directly precipitated 
by financial market chicanery, as was the case with the Great Crash of 1929, 
such a deep-seated belief is unlikely to be formed. 
Nonetheless, Japan’s adoption of a new rationale for the prohibition of 
insider trading, coupled with a new independent watchdog and increased 
enforcement, is encouraging. If correctly implemented, such reforms should 
pay great dividends in the future. Having come this far however, the 
 
 
 167. Referring to short sales, which were widely blamed for the Great Crash of 1929, Mr. Thomas 
Corcoran testified that a great many people felt that the practice ought to be “legislated out of 
existence.” Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Committee on Interstate Banking 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (testimony of Mr. Thomas Corcoran).  
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government must not rest on its laurels. Rather it must address the challenges 
facing the regime which include, inter alia, more resources dedicated to 
finding and punishing those who violate the law. 
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